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ABSTRACT 
Institutional quality and trade have been found to influence economic performance in several 
empirical studies investigating the separate effect of trade and institutions on growth. Recent 
studies examining the simultaneous effect of instrumented measures of both variables on 
growth observe a significant impact for institutional quality, but not trade. This they often 
ascribe to the “primacy” of institutions. In this paper, we revisit the argument by employing an 
IV estimator and a “modern” panel data technique, system GMM, to investigate the partial 
effect of trade and institutions on economic growth in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), for the period 
2000 – 2016.  Using IV-2SLS, our findings confirm a positive impact for rule of law with no 
significant impact for trade. But then, our first-stage results show commonly used instruments 
for trade and institutions in the literature, which are also employed in this study, are themselves 
highly correlated, rendering our IV estimates unreliable. Using system GMM however, our 
findings indicate positive effect for trade and various measures of institutional quality on 
growth in SSA.  Of measures of institutional quality, political stability and control of corruption 
are the most important followed by government effectiveness, rule of law and voice and 
accountability in that order. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Why do countries grow faster than others? As old as this question is, especially in development 
circles, there is still no consensus as to what the answer is, and as such remains a source of 
debate and disagreement among economist. The widely held view is that physical and human 
capital accumulation accounts for growth differences among countries. This view has been 
criticized, and rightly so, for being limited in its approach to understanding economic growth 
and development. For instance, Easterly and Levine (2002) show that output not accounted for 
by factors of production accounts for a huge portion of growth and income differences across 
countries. Moreover, factor accumulation argument alone fails to explain some more recent 
patterns of growth. In recent years, poorer countries are on average more likely to grow faster 
than high-income economies (see appendix I), even though the latter have more physical and 
human capital and are more technologically advanced. It therefore stands to reason that 
“something else” other than just capital accumulation might explain differences in growth 
across countries (Easterly & Levine, 2002). This view is reechoed by North and Thomas (1973), 
who note that factor accumulation and innovation are proximate but not fundamental cause of 
long-run growth. Perhaps a more appropriate question should be what motivates countries to 
devote resources to invest in physical and human capital and what influences them to innovate? 
Lewis (1954) concurs that the central problem in economic development is understanding what 
triggers an economy that was previously saving and investing less to suddenly and voluntarily 
transform itself into an economy that saves more and more of its national income. To expand 
this argument, recent history is full of episodes where previously poor countries suddenly attain 
and maintain higher incomes and standards of living. For example, the Four Asian Tigers 
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(Hong Kong, Singapore, Republic of Korea, and Taiwan) between the 1960s and 1990s and 
more recently China. Understanding what triggered the rapid transformation in these 
economies is to understand, to a great extent, the fundamental cause of rapid economic growth.  
In trying to explain these recent growth trends, two main assertions have emerged. The first 
posits that integration into the world economy through trade is the main driver of rapid 
economic transformation. Thus, countries that are more open to trade will grow faster since 
trade is believed to facilitate knowledge and technology transfer as well as capital inflows. 
Trade also leads to greater competition, economies of scale, and knowledge spill over in the 
domestic economy. Proponents of this argument often cite the growth experiences of the Four 
Asian Tigers. These economies are believed to have capitalized on the expansion in world trade 
in the 1960s to launch arguable the greatest economic success story in recent history. 
The second, and probably more recent argument stresses the importance of institutions1 in 
influencing economic decisions and subsequently economic growth. Advocates of this 
argument reason that countries with well-functioning institutions are more likely to safeguard 
property rights, enforce contracts and implement market friendly policies which in turn 
influences decision to invest in factors of production among other things (North, 1991; 
Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson, 2005). Weak institutions on the other hand create 
uncertainties for economic actors thereby stifling incentives to invest or innovate. Countries 
with stronger institutions are therefore expected to grow faster. In explaining recent trends in 
growth, institutionalists argue that poor countries are more likely to attain higher growth rates 
when they implement institutional reforms.  For instance, China’s economic resurgence in the 
1980s is attributed to reforms adopted following the death of longtime communist leader Mao 
                                                 
1 North (1991), “Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social 
interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)” (p. 97).  
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Zedong (Acemoglu, 2008). Other cases for institutional reforms preceding exceptional 
economic performance are made by several authors for countries such as Botswana (see 
Goldsmith, 1998; Lewin 2011) and Mauritius (see Zafar, 2011) in Africa, and Chile (see Kalter, 
2004) in South America.  
1.2 Statement of Problem 
Presently, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is the poorest region in the world owing to recent 
economic growth success in Asia, precisely China and India, which were once home to a 
significant number of the world’s poor. Africa’s development predicament is a widely 
discussed issue and a matter of great concern to development partners and international 
community at large; and despite various multilateral efforts at restructuring the economies of 
SSA countries, the region has little to show in terms of economic performance.  
Interestingly, available evidence shows that some high performing East Asian countries had 
income levels comparable to most SSA countries in the 1950s. GDP per capita in South Korea 
($854) and Taiwan ($916) in 1950 was much less than it was in countries such as Ghana 
($1,122) and Senegal ($1,259) (Bolt, Timmer, & van Zanden, 2014). Presently, GDP per capita 
in both Taiwan and South Korea is multiple of what it was some decades ago whilst GDP per 
capita of most African countries has either stagnated or declined over the same period. A 
thought-provoking question for researchers and policy makers is how these economies which 
were once at par if not worse than SSA in the 1950s, were able to propel themselves out of 
economic misery to the most celebrated economic success story in recent history.  
It is a widely held view that the East Asian miracle was propelled by a policy shift towards 
export expansion (Rodrik, 1994; Stiglitz, 1996). The four Asian Tigers’ share of world exports, 
which was about 1% in 1960, rose substantially over a period of three decades reaching 10% 
in the early 1990s (UNTADstat, 2017). This expansion in exports was followed by 
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unprecedented improvement in almost all socio-economic variables in all four economies. 
Unsurprisingly, many countries have tried replicating the East Asian experience with very little 
success. Birdsall et al. (1993) points out that the strict and rigorous institutional mechanisms 
required for policy success in East Asia was not followed in most of these countries. It should 
be understood that economic reforms are primarily matters of public policy, and their success 
is determined by the quality of institutions. In places where institutions are weak, policy is 
likely to be ineffective (Goldsmith, 1998). Weak institutions are mostly credited with the 
failure of some well-intended policies in SSA.  Goldsmith (1998) argues that GDP per capita, 
gross domestic saving and merchandise exports in SSA declined between 1980 and 1995 
following the implementation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)/World Bank 
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). The SAPs incorporated a bundle of free market 
policies primarily aimed at promoting privatization and trade. These policies collectively 
became known as the “Washington Consensus”. Curiously, however, the implementation of 
these policies brought several countries to the brink of collapse. According to Owusu and 
Ng’ambi (2002), agricultural liberalization in accordance with the implementation of the 
“Washington Consensus” caused severe food crisis in Malawi. Stiglitz (2005) indicates that 
countries that adopted the “Washington Consensus” performed poorly economically compared 
to decades preceding the adoption of the policies. On the contrary, China with a largely planned 
but open economy with private property rights experienced expansion in international trade as 
well as better economic performance (see Qian, 2002). The failure of the “Washington 
Consensus” as pointed out by Stiglitz (2005) and Rodrick (2006) is a result of its strict 
adherence to the principle of market fundamentalism2 without any regard for the institutional 
and policy environment within which the policies were to be implemented. In reality, markets 
                                                 
2  Market fundamentalism – Belief that when left alone to operate, markets can solve all economic and social 
problems and always lead to efficient outcome. 
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will function properly if the rules that govern economic activities are well established and likely 
to be enforced. As noted by Serra and Stiglitz (2008), in the presence of asymmetric 
information and imperfect market, the economic theory on which the “Washington Consensus” 
was formed is flawed.  
Additionally, in societies where property rights are not well defined, economic agents have no 
incentive to devote resources towards investment in physical or human capital or the use of 
more efficient technologies (Acemoglu et al., 2005). As reiterated by Olson (1996) most poor 
countries are poor because they lack basic institutions that enforce contracts and protect 
property rights, and so they lose the potential gains from such transactions. The risk of 
expropriation of assets has been a major concern for foreign investment in the sub-region. 
Foreigners are at risk of losing their entire operations due to outright confiscation by 
governments (such as the land reform in Zimbabwe in 1980 or the expropriation of mines in 
DR Congo in 2009).  In some cases, they are forced to sell controlling stakes in their operation 
to government or locals. The situation is made worse by lack of independent and impartial 
domestic courts in countries where these incidents occur, thus forcing foreign firms to seek 
international arbitration which may take years to reach a ruling. Likewise, political instability 
is endemic in the sub-region and has long been a major concern to both domestic and foreign 
investors. It has affected investment and economic growth in general. Foreign investment, like 
trade, is a much-needed source of foreign technology transfer without which output and 
productivity in the sub-region are adversely affected. 
It is very surprising that after decades of implementing trade liberalization and other market-
oriented policies, African economies continue to experience slow growth, stagnation and 
deprivation despite the success of comparable policies in different parts of the world. This 
shows trade alone is not enough to guarantee economic prosperity. The potential for trade to 
accelerate growth also depends on factors that take advantage of opportunities integration 
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presents. As some country experience has shown, political stability, stable macroeconomic 
management, and rule of law are key to ensuring the gains from trade are sufficiently realized 
and the opportunities presented by them are adequately exploited to ensure economic success.    
1.3 Research Questions 
This study therefore seeks to find answers to the questions below. 
 Do trade openness and institutional quality exert a simultaneous impact on economic 
growth in SSA? 
 Which form or forms of institution is significant for economic growth in SSA? 
 
1.4 Objectives of the Study 
The core objective of this research is to examine the relationship between institutions, trade 
and economic growth in SSA. To do this we will attempt to; 
 Empirically analyze the impact of trade and institutions on economic growth. 
 Investigate the various forms of institutions and how they impact on economic growth.  
 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
Although 15 percent of the world’s population live in SSA, half of the number of people living 
in absolute poverty are found in the region (see Poverty Figures – World Bank, 2017). It is 
widely acknowledged that one of the fastest ways to lift that much people from abject poverty 
to some minimum standard of living is through rapid economic growth. Recognizing this, there 
has been various policies and programs implemented in the sub-region with the aim of 
stimulating economic growth. However, these policies have one after the other failed to meet 
expectations. This has led to the region being nicknamed the “graveyard” of well-intended 
policies. This study argues that the reason for this policy failure as well as the region’s 
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development snag is due to poor institutional structures.  By recognizing the role of institutions 
in the economic growth process, this study seeks to provoke a rethinking of the approach to 
solving Africa’s development problems.  
 
1.6 Scope and Source of Data 
This study covers 45 SSA countries for the period 2000 to 2016.  Liberia, Sierra Leone, and 
South Sudan omitted due to inconsistent data. Data on GDP per capita, trade-GDP ratio, gross 
fixed capital formation, and population growth is sourced from World Bank’s Worldwide 
Development Indicators (WDI) Database. Measures of institutional quality namely, rule of law, 
control of corruption, regulatory quality, voice and accountability, government effectiveness, 
and political stability and absence of violence are sourced from Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) Database. Data on index of human capital is obtained from the Penn World 
Table (PWT) version 9.0, the index is constructed using returns to education (Psacharopoulos, 
1994) and average years of schooling (Barro & Lee, 2012). The use of secondary school 
enrolment rate as proxy for human capital is avoided due to inconsistent enrolment data for 
most African countries. The human capital index from the PWT is available for only 34 SSA 
countries and for the period 2000 – 2014.  This implies that in specifications where the human 
capital index is used the sample decreases from 45 to 34 countries. To circumvent this problem, 
in specifications where the human capital index is used, results for the 45-country sample will 
also be presented, albeit without the human capital variable. Furthermore, like other studies 
investigating the relationship between trade and growth or institutions and growth, we are faced 
with some econometric hurdles. Notably, issues of reverse causality and probable measurement 
errors which are notorious sources of endogeneity. We intend to mitigate this problem by 
employing two estimation techniques namely an instrumental variable (IV) method and a 
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system generalized method of moments (system GMM). Trade is instrumented using an index 
built by Frankel and Romer (1999) in the IV estimation. The index is developed from a 
modified gravity model and it is widely used in empirical studies. Bilateral trade data for the 
model is obtained from the database of the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics. Data 
on countries geographic characteristics is based on work by Mayer and Zignago (2011), and it 
is obtained from Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII). 
Furthermore, institution is instrumented using data on measure of European settler mortality 
by Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001).  
1.7 Organization of the Study 
This study is organized into five main chapters. Introduction, problem statement and research 
questions are presented in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 presents the literature review. Methodology is 
discussed in Chapter 3. The main findings are presented in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 outlines 
concluding remarks and policy recommendations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
A comprehensive review of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship 
between trade and growth, and institutions and growth are presented in this chapter. We further 
discuss more recent literature relating institutions, trade and economic growth.   
The rest of chapter is arranged as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the theoretical literature, 
section 2.3 looks at the empirical literature and section 2.4 concludes.   
2.2  Theoretical Literature 
The idea that trade promotes growth predates modern economics and has defined economic 
thought as early as the sixteenth century. The mercantilist believed that through growth in net 
exports nations could accumulate wealth and achieve higher growth (Landreth and Colander, 
2002). Classical trade theories by Adam Smith (1776) and David Ricardo (1817) focus on the 
gains from trade arising from allocation efficiency as resources are moved to more productive 
sectors of the economy. They predict that in the end trade will not only boost domestic 
production but international output through international division of labor and specialization. 
The classical theory of trade was formulated within the framework of perfect competition, 
comparative cost advantage and constant returns to scale. This framework limits the range of 
goods a country can efficiently produce to its endowments of factors of production. More recent 
theories of trade transcend these boundaries to demonstrate that there are benefits to 
discovering and specializing in producing high externality goods. Lately, the impact of trade 
on economic performance is attributed to dynamic gains driven by greater knowledge spillover, 
technological progress, competition, and economies of scale.  
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The new-growth theory for instance recognizes trade as a key driver of economic development 
especially in developing countries due to its role in facilitating knowledge and technology 
transfer. New growth theorist maintain that international trade would promote growth in 
developing countries through technology spillover and external stimulation. Thus, overtime 
developing countries will gradually acquire and learn foreign technologies as they trade with 
advanced countries. Furthermore, trade will encourage innovation due to increased competition 
in the domestic market.   
The New Trade Theory (NTT), largely influenced by the works of economists such as Paul 
Krugman, sought to address some of the shortcomings of the traditional trade theories by taking 
into account some realities and complexities of modern trade. For instance, empirical data 
indicates that a substantial amount of world trade takes place between countries with similar 
factor endowments and technology. With little difference between trading parties, traditional 
trade theories predict little gains from trade. However, a number of countries have actually 
prospered trading this way. To explain this fact, NTT incorporates factors such as economies 
of scale, network effects and imperfect competition. Although countries may be similar in 
terms of factor endowments and productivity, trade may still be beneficial due to economies of 
scale. Economies of scale can be internal or external to a firm. With external economies of 
scale, the industry average cost declines as the number of firms increases. When scale 
economies are internal, the average cost of the firm declines as its output increases due to some 
cost advantages the firm enjoys as it scales up production. The presence of internal economies 
of scale alters the structure of the market leading to some form of monopolistic competition; 
with firms producing differentiated products and competing on the basis of brand or quality. 
The number of firms or the extent to which firms can scale up production is constrained by the 
size of the market. With international trade, market size expands considerably allowing for 
production at a much larger scale. Countries therefore specialize and produce a narrow variety 
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of goods, whilst importing what they don’t produce from other countries. By limiting 
production to a narrow variety, each country is able to reap benefits associated with increasing 
returns and network effects. More varieties of the good is produced than if each country 
produced alone and at a much lower cost to consumers in both countries. Another important 
element of the NTT is that first-movers in a particular industry enjoy substantial economies of 
scale thereby dominating global markets. For this reason, economies that industrialized early 
have some form of competitive advantage. It also implies developing countries may struggle 
to enter global markets due to economies of scale already enjoyed by high-income countries. 
Some advocates of the NTT argue that for developing countries, using protectionist policies to 
build industries capable of competing in the world market or those that generate huge positive 
externalities could be beneficial for growth. They maintain that protectionist policies were key 
to the development of the auto industry in Japan, which is presently one of the biggest in the 
world, as well as other industries with huge technological impacts in most East Asian countries 
(MacEwan, 1999). However, the use of protectionist policies to support the growth of 
industries is highly contentious. One argument often made by critics is that government may 
not be well informed about which industry to support and how to go about it. Also, governments 
sometimes act to maximize their self-interest which may not necessarily be in the public’s 
interest (Krueger, 1974; Bhagwati, 1982). Thus, intervention might lead to rent-seeking or the 
promotion of inefficient industries. Moreover, the strict institutional requirement necessary for 
such an intervention to be successful may not be present in most developing countries. Strong 
institutions are crucial in determining the type of policies to be implemented, how best to 
execute them and how to ensure its continuity (Goldsmith, 1998). Nevertheless, for most 
developing countries who are late entrants into the world market, some form of selective 
protectionism may be necessary in developing important industries in the face of increasing 
competition.   
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Melitz (2003) pioneered a new trend in the study of international trade with specific focus on 
differences among firms in the same industry of the same country. This trend is commonly 
referred to as the “New” New Trade Theory (NNTT). Unlike previously discussed theories, the 
NNTT relaxes the assumption of homogenous productivity across firms in the same industry. 
The theory recognizes that firms within the same industry have different productivity levels. 
Likewise, within the same industry some firms may engage in exports whilst others may not. 
Even within the so-called export industries, not all firms engage in exports; and among 
exporters productivity largely differs. In fact, available evidence shows only a small number 
of highly productive firms engage in exports. According to Bernard et al. (2007), only 4.4% of 
the total number of firms in the U.S in 2000 were engaged in exports, of which the top 10% 
accounted for 96% of total exports by value. Lileeva and Trefler (2010) also show that 
Canadian manufacturing firms which began exporting between 1984 and 1996 were 7% more 
productive and 58% larger than non-exporters. NNTT explains that, given the high fixed cost 
involved in participating in international markets, only highly productive and profitable firms 
are likely to get involved. Hence, highly productive firms self-select into export markets. 
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004), extend this argument to firms engaged in local production 
abroad or Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). They show that, among exporters only highly 
productive ones are able to cover the huge costs involved in setting up production abroad. 
According to NNTT, exposure to international trade will reallocate resources towards more 
efficient firms. When a country opens up to trade, least efficient firms will be forced out of the 
industry whilst more efficient firms gain in terms of increased production and profits. Although 
reallocation may entail some short-run costs, there is often considerably benefits to be gained 
in the long-run. Proponents of NNTT therefore caution against any government policy that 
might interfere with the reallocation process. This suggests protection given to domestic firms 
may inhibit or prevent a country from reaping the full benefits of trade.  
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The links between institutions and economic performance is attributed to seminal works by 
Coase (1937; 1960), Williamson (1971) and North (1991) which initiated a movement known 
as the New Institutional Economics (NIE). The term NIE was first used by Williamson (1975) 
to distinguish it from Institutional Economics. NIE, unlike Institutional Economics, does not 
completely reject neoclassical theory but rather modifies and extends it to address some of its 
shortcomings. NIE incorporates transaction cost economics, contract theory, and property 
rights into economic growth analysis and its primary argument is that institutions matter for 
economic development. The concept of transaction cost is attributed to the work by Coase 
(1937). Coase quizzed why firms exist if individuals could engage directly with each other to 
undertake exchange? To which he answered that there is transaction cost in organizing such 
arrangements and firms will emerge if it costs less to transact with them than directly through 
the market. By eliminating impediments to direct exchange, firms can reduce transaction cost 
substantially. Coase (1992) cautions that when transaction cost outweighs the potential gains 
from a particular exchange, that exchange will not take place and this may affect productivity 
in an economy.  Williamson (1971) is credited for contributions in contract theory by stressing 
the importance of incomplete contracts. Contracts are supposed to stipulate what parties to an 
economic exchange can and cannot do and how some negative fallouts can be resolved. 
However, due to the fact that a party to a contract may have some private information or may 
act in a way that may not be verified in courts, contracts in the real world are mostly incomplete. 
Incomplete contracts give rise to opportunistic behaviour by individuals who may want to cheat 
to benefit more from the exchange. Property right on the other hand determines how economic 
resources are owned and used. It protects individuals from risk of expropriation and hence 
encourages investment (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005). Institutions reduce risks, uncertainties 
and lower transaction costs associated with economic exchanges through property rights 
protection, contract enforcement and policy predictability. Hence, in societies where there is 
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certainty that contracts will be enforced and property rights protected, people will be more 
willing to specialize, invest in assets, and undertake complex transactions which will lead to 
economic growth (North, 1991). 
North (1991) makes a critical distinction between organizations (players of the game) and 
institutions (rules of the game). He notes that there exists a symbiotic relationship between the 
two which is crucial to economic performance. Institutions make available opportunities that 
organizations can take advantage of, and as organizations evolve they alter the structure of 
institutions. Therefore, in societies where existing institutions do not invest in enhancing 
productivity, organizations will accordingly evolve to be inefficient thereby making societies 
unproductive. Subsequently, these inefficient organizations influence institutions by making 
them less likely to engage in productive activities, and the cycle repeats itself. The opposite 
also holds.   
Acemoglu et al. (2005) develop a comprehensive framework that explains how good or bad 
institutions emerge and why they persist over time. They argue that, at any point in time, the 
group with sufficient political power to alter the rules determine the set of institutions that 
prevails in society. This implies bad institutions may persist if the group with political power 
are unwilling to change them. The balance of political power is however jointly dictated by the 
distribution of economic resources and political institutions. Institutioins that encourage 
economic growth will emerge if power is allocated to those who are inclined to exercise control 
on the use of their power and whose interest are in broad-based policies that encourage 
participation in economic activities. Acemoglu et al. (2005) use historical cases to demonstrate 
the assumptions, working and the implications of their framework. They argue that successful 
reforms that led to unprecedented development such as the Glorious Revolution in Britain and 
the East Asian “Miracle” could be explained within the framework. 
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2.3  Empirical Literature 
There is a vast amount of empirical literature on the trade-growth link. Studies such as Dollar 
(1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Frankel and Romer (1999), Dollar and Kraay (2002; 2004) 
and Irwin and Terviö (2002) maintain that countries that are more open tend to growth faster. 
Others such as Harrison (1996) and Jin (2004) suggest trade-growth link is ambiguous whilst 
some go as far as to suggest trade retards growth. For Rodrik (2001), the only relationship that 
exist between trade and growth is that countries reduce trade restrictions as they get richer.  The 
literature focusing on Africa or developing countries is similarly mixed (see Greenaway et al., 
2002; Rodrik et al., 2004). A growing number of studies have also investigated the relationship 
between institutions and economic performance, prominent among them are Hall and Jones 
(1999) and Acemoglu et al. (2001). These studies are largely supportive of the positive link 
between institutions and growth. More recent studies such as Dollar and Kraay (2003), Alcalá 
and Ciccone (2004), and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004) examine the impact of both 
trade and institutions on economic performance. The remainder of this sections presents a 
detailed discussion of some of the above-mentioned studies.  
In their widely cited paper, Sachs and Warner (1995) investigating the effect of trade 
liberalization on economic performance for the period 1970 – 1989 reveal that open economies 
outperform closed economies. They showed that for a group of open economies, developing 
countries tend to grow faster than developed ones. Open developing economies attained 4.49 
percent annual per-capita income growth, whilst open developed economies grew at 2.29 
percent per year over the same period. Close developed economies however experienced higher 
income growth (0.74 percent) than developing economies (0.69 percent). They further asserted 
that open economies in general surpassed closed economies on both structural change and 
avoidance of extreme macroeconomic crises. However, failure to control for endogeneity 
between openness and growth casts some doubts on the conclusion of Sachs and Warner (1995). 
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Simple correlation between openness and growth cannot be sufficiently identified as causal 
impact.  
Frankel and Romer (1999) on the other hand examined the income effect of trade openness 
whilst controlling for endogeneity between trade and income. They maintain that since a 
country’s geographic characteristics affects trade, and are not correlated to other determinants 
of income, they can be suitably used to derive IV estimates of trade on income. Therefore, 
using a modified gravity model, they estimated predicted trade share using geographic 
characteristics which they employed as instruments for actual trade share. Using cross-country 
data for 150 countries, they demonstrate that a percentage point increase in the trade share 
raises income per capita by 1.97 percent. They reveal that trade affects income through human 
and physical capital accumulation as well as increased productivity. The novelty in Frankel 
and Romer (1999) is the use of predicted trade share from a modified gravity model as 
instrument for actual trade share. This study follows similar approach to instrument trade in 
economic growth regressions.  
A parallel group of literature have been investigating the relationship between institutions and 
growth. Hall and Jones (1999) provide evidence that supports the view that a country’s long-
run economic performance depends primarily on government policies and institutions. In 
examining output per worker differential across countries, they observed that government 
polies and institutions, which they termed social infrastructure, was the main determinant of 
productivity differences. They argue that the huge disparities in output per worker is only partly 
explained by educational attainment and physical capital. They use correlates of Western 
European influence such as the proportion of the population that speaks English and a major 
European language and distance from the equator as instruments for institutions (social 
infrastructure). Their result indicates that a 0.01 difference in institutions (social infrastructure) 
corresponds to a diﬀerence in output per worker of 5.14 percent.  
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In probably the most influential work on the subject, Acemoglu et al. (2001) use variations in 
European settler mortality to examine the impact of institutions on economic performance. 
Settler mortality measures mortality rate of soldiers, bishops and sailors of European origins in 
settlements prior to 1850. They are of the view that since Europeans couldn’t settle in places 
where they faced high mortalities, they set up extractive institutions and these institutions 
persisted and formed the basis of present institutions. Since past institutions could only affect 
income today through present institutions, they argue that settler mortality could be used as 
instrument for present institutions. Employing an instrumental variable (IV) approach, they 
estimate that the impact of institutions on income per capita is 0.94. They also revealed that 
once institution is controlled for neither geography nor African dummy is significant. 
Suggesting that Africa’s poor economic performance is not due to geography but because of 
weak institutions. Following Acemoglu et al. (2001), a number of subsequent studies have 
employed European settler mortality rates as instrument for present institutions.  However, the 
settler mortality variable has recently come under severe criticism. Albouy (2012) argues that 
of the 64 countries in the study, only 28 had mortality rates that are originally attributed to the 
settlements. The remaining 36 were estimated by the authors using similarity of diseased 
environment. In response, Acemoglu et al. (2012) maintain that their estimates are robust and 
have been confirmed by other historical records and therefore are reliable.     
Another category of research has emerged in recent years examining the impact of both 
institutions and trade on economic performance. Rodrik et al. (2004) examine contributions of 
integration and institutions in influencing income differences across countries. They employ 
settler mortality as in Acemoglu et al. (2001) as instruments for institutions in a sample of 80 
countries and the proportion of population that speaks English and other major European 
languages as instruments for a larger sample of 140 countries as in Hall and Jones (1999). 
Frankel-Romer (1999) predicted trade was used as instruments for actual trade in both samples. 
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The IV estimate shows that a unit increase in institutional quality produces a 2.15 increase in 
log income in the 80-country sample and a 1.32 increase in log income in the 140-country 
sample.   Rodrik et al. (2004) concurs with Acemoglu et al. (2001) that geography has no 
significant effect on income once institutions are controlled for. Furthermore, trade was 
insignificant with a negative coefficient in almost all specifications. This they attribute to the 
primacy of institutions, that is, the quality of institutions “trumps” all other factors when it 
comes to cross-country growth regressions.   
Alcalá and Ciccone (2004) use a different measure of trade openness which they call “real 
openness”. They were of the opinion that the traditional measures of trade openness, thus 
nominal values of trade divided by that of GDP, yields biased estimate of trade on productivity. 
They therefore estimate real openness using the ratio of nominal trade to PPP GDP. Alcalá and 
Ciccone (2004) found a positive and robust relationship for both real openness and institutional 
quality on income.  
Dollar and Kraay (2003) analyze the relationship between trade, institutions and growth using 
both levels and dynamic regressions. They reason that, results obtained from levels equation 
may be uninformative about the partial impact of institutions and trade on economic growth 
since instruments for both institutions and trade are highly correlated. However, dynamic 
regressions might be more appropriate since changes in institutions and trade are not likely to 
be correlated. Indeed, their estimation results for the levels regression shows that trade loses 
its significance when both trade and institutions are instrumented. Also, the significance of the 
institution variable is largely due to the inclusion of four “neo-Europes” – Australia, United 
States of America, New Zealand, and Canada – in the sample. They attribute the insignificance 
of both trade and institutions to high correlation between fitted values of trade and institution. 
For the levels equation, Dollar and Kraay (2003) instrument institutions using proportion of 
population that speaks English and other major European language as in Hall and Jones (1999), 
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and also European settler mortality as in Acemoglu et al. (2001). They note that the instrument 
by Hall and Jones (1999) was available for a larger sample of countries although settler 
mortality by Acemoglu et al. (2001) was much compelling, albeit being available for a smaller 
number of countries.  The use of either instruments does not alter their conclusion. Following 
Frankel and Romer (1999), they instrument trade using fitted values of trade estimated from a 
gravity model. The decadal dynamic regression however showed a strong positive relationship 
between instrumented changes in institutional quality and changes in trade on economic growth. 
They instrument changes in trade and institutional quality using their levels at the beginning of 
the previous decade. Dollar and Kraay (2003) is influential in discovering that the widely used 
instruments of trade and institutions are themselves highly correlated.  
2.4  Conclusion   
Given the discussions above, one can only assume that the debate on the impact of trade and 
institutions on economic growth is just beginning to take off. This study advances the 
discussion in the following ways. First, giving that the institution argument centers around the 
role played by geography and colonization on past institutions and subsequently institutions 
today, it is relevant to analyze the impact of institutions and trade within a relatively 
homogenous sample of countries with very similar geography and colonial history. By so doing, 
we eliminate a great deal of cross-country regression bias.  
Secondly, by using panel data we can control for unobserved country specific effect which 
might cause bias in coefficient estimates. Furthermore, we are able to exploit some advantages 
it has over cross-section estimation by allowing us to estimate how changes in institutions and 
trade over time affects growth.     
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we present the theoretical framework, description of variables and data source, 
model for empirical estimation, and discussion of econometric methodology. 
The chapter is arranged as follows: Section 3.2 presents the theoretical framework. Section 3.3 
outlines description of all variables. Section 3.4 illustrates the model for empirical estimation. 
Section 3.5 discusses the choice of econometric methodology. Section 3.6 concludes.  
3.2 Theoretical framework 
The baseline model for this study is based on the human capital augmented Solow model 
advanced by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992). Following Solow (1956), Mankiw et al. (1992) 
construct their model by adding a human capital variable to a traditional Cobb-Douglas 
production function. The modified production function hence took the form; 
𝑌௧ ൌ 𝐾௧ఈ𝐻௧ఉሺ𝐴௧𝐿௧ሻଵିఈିఉ 
ሺ3.1ሻ 
Where 𝑡 represents time, Y output, K physical capital, 𝛼 output elasticity of physical capital, H 
human capital, 𝛽 output elasticity of human capital, A level of technology, L labour, and AL 
effective labour. Dividing both sides of equation 3.1 by AL gives the equation in intensive form: 
𝑦௧ ൌ 𝑘௧ఈℎ௧ఉ 
ሺ3.2ሻ 
Where 𝑦௧ is output per effective labour, 𝑘௧  is physical capital per effective labour and ℎ௧ is 
human capital per effective labour. Following Solow (1956), they note that effective labour 
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𝐴௧𝐿௧  grows at a rate ሺ𝑛 ൅ 𝑔ሻ,  where n and g are growth rates of labour and technology 
respectively, and capital depreciates at a fixed rate 𝛿  (for simplicity Mankiw et al. (1992) 
assume both human and physical capital depreciate at the same rate). They further assumed a 
fraction of income 𝑠𝑦ሺ௧ሻ is saved and split between investment in physical capital (𝑠௞ሻ and 
human capital ሺ𝑠௛ሻ such that 𝑠 ൌ  𝑠௞ା𝑠௛ . Therefore, the rate of physical and human capital per 
effective labour accumulation overtime is given as;  
 𝑑𝑘௧𝑑𝑡 ൌ 𝑘ሶ ௧ ൌ 𝑠௞𝑦௧ െ ሺ𝑛 ൅ 𝑔 ൅ 𝛿ሻ𝑘௧ 
𝑑ℎ௧
𝑑𝑡 ൌ ℎሶ ௧ ൌ 𝑠௛𝑦௧ െ ሺ𝑛 ൅ 𝑔 ൅ 𝛿ሻℎ௧ 
ሺ3.3ሻ 
𝑠௞𝑦௧ and 𝑠௛𝑦௧ are the fractions of output per effective labour that are invested in physical and 
human capital, and the term ሺ𝑛 ൅ 𝑔 ൅ 𝛿ሻ  represents the minimum level of investment 
necessary to keep 𝑘௧ or ℎ௧ from falling. 
The steady-state equilibrium growth path, that is, the state at which both physical and human 
capital are constant, is given as; 
𝑘ሶ ௧ ൌ ℎሶ ௧ ൌ 0 
(3.4) 
We can find the steady state levels of 𝑘 and ℎ by inserting 𝑦௧ in equation (3.2) into equation 
(3.3) and setting both 𝑘ሶ ௧ and ℎሶ ௧ in equation (3.3) to zero. This therefore yields; 
𝑘∗ ൌ ሺ 𝑠௞
ଵିఉ𝑠௛ఉ
𝑛 ൅ 𝑔 ൅ 𝛿ሻ
ଵ ሺଵିఈିఉሻ⁄  
ℎ∗ ൌ ሺ 𝑠௞
ఈ𝑠௛ଵିఈ
𝑛 ൅ 𝑔 ൅ 𝛿ሻ
ଵ ሺଵିఈିఉሻ⁄  
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ሺ3.5ሻ 
Accordingly, output per effective labour at the steady state will be;  
𝑦∗ ൌ ሺ𝑘∗ሻఈሺℎ∗ሻఉ 
𝑦∗ ൌ ሾሺ 𝑠௞
ଵିఉ𝑠௛ఉ
𝑛 ൅ 𝑔 ൅ 𝛿ሻ
ଵ ሺଵିఈିఉሻ⁄ ሿఈሾሺ 𝑠௞
ఈ𝑠௛ଵିఈ
𝑛 ൅ 𝑔 ൅ 𝛿ሻ
ଵ ሺଵିఈିఉሻ⁄ ሿఉ 
 
             (3.6) 
Finding natural logs of both sides of equation 3.6 above and simplifying yields: 
𝑙𝑛𝑦∗ ൌ െ 𝛼 ൅ 𝛽1 െ 𝛼 െ 𝛽 𝑙𝑛ሺ𝑛 ൅ 𝑔 ൅ 𝛿ሻ ൅ 
𝛼
1 െ 𝛼 െ 𝛽 𝑙𝑛𝑠௞ ൅
𝛽
1 െ 𝛼 െ 𝛽 𝑙𝑛𝑠௛ 
ሺ3.7ሻ 
Furthermore, Mankiw et al. (1992) give the equation for the rate of convergence as; 
𝑙𝑛𝑦௧ െ 𝑙𝑛𝑦଴ ൌ 1 െ 𝑒ିఒ௧ሺ𝑙𝑛𝑦∗ െ 𝑙𝑛𝑦଴ሻ 
ሺ3.8ሻ 
Where 𝜆 ൌ ሺ𝑛 ൅ 𝑔 ൅ 𝛿ሻ and 𝑦଴ is income per effective labour at an earlier period. Inserting 
𝑙𝑛𝑦∗ from equation (3.7) into the equation for the rate of convergence yields. 
𝑙𝑛𝑦௧ െ 𝑙𝑛𝑦଴ ൌ ൤െ 𝛼 ൅ 𝛽1 െ 𝛼 െ 𝛽 𝑙𝑛ሺ𝑛 ൅ 𝑔 ൅ 𝛿ሻ ൅  
𝛼
1 െ 𝛼 െ 𝛽 𝑙𝑛𝑠௞ ൅
𝛽
1 െ 𝛼 െ 𝛽 𝑙𝑛𝑠௛ െ 𝑙𝑛𝑦଴ ൨ ൫1
െ 𝑒ିఒ௧൯ 
ሺ3.9ሻ 
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Equation (3.9) above expresses change in log income per effective labour as a function of 
income per effective labour at an initial period 𝑦0, rate of population growth 𝑛, and rate of 
investment in physical capital 𝑠௞ and human capital 𝑠௛.     
Using discrete time approximations, equation 3.9 can be simplified into a general growth 
regression model of the form: 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑦௧ ൌ 𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑦଴ ൅ 𝑋′௧𝛽 ൅ 𝜀௧ 
ሺ3.10ሻ 
Where 𝑋′௧ is a matrix of factors that affect growth and 𝜀௧ is a stochastic term capturing all 
omitted influence. Regression model specified in this form is widely used in empirical growth 
analysis. Its extensive use is attributed to the freedom it grants researchers in testing the effect 
of other variables of interest on growth.  
Writing equation 3.10 to mirror the panel structure of our data and our research objective yields; 
∆𝑙𝑛𝑦௜௧ ൌ  𝛾𝑙𝑛𝑦௜௧ିଵ  ൅ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡௜௧ ൅ 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒௜௧ ൅ 𝑋ᇱ௜௧𝛽 ൅ 𝜀௜௧                   
                                                   𝜀௜௧ ൌ 𝜇௜ ൅ 𝑣௜௧    and 𝛾 ൏ 1 
ሺ3.11ሻ 
Where t represents time, i countries, 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡 and 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 are our variables of interest denoting 
index of institutional quality and log of trade-GDP ratio respectively, 𝑋௜௧  is the matrix of 
control variables, 𝜇௜ represents individual country effect and 𝑣௜௧ is the idiosyncratic error term. 
Barro (1998, 2001, 2003) estimates a similar model with both rule of law and trade openness 
as explanatory variables. 
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3.3  Model for empirical estimation 
Following the theoretical model presented in equation (3.11) above, the model for empirical 
estimation is specified as: 
 
∆𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶௜௧ ൌ 𝛼଴ ൅ 𝛼ଵ𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶௜,௧ିଵ ൅ 𝛼ଶ𝐼𝑄௜௧ ൅ 𝛼ଷ𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒௜௧ ൅ 𝛼ସ ln 𝐻𝐶௜௧ ൅
𝛼ହ 𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑣௜௧ ൅ 𝛼଺𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑃𝑔௜௧ ൅  𝜀௜௧   
ሺ3.12ሻ 
∆𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶௜,௧ ൌ  𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 log 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎 𝑃𝑃𝑃  
𝑙𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶௜,௧ିଵ ൌ log 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎  
𝐼𝑄௜௧  ൌ  𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  
𝑙𝑛𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 ൌ log 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 െ 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 
𝑙𝑛𝐻𝐶௜,௧ ൌ log 𝑜𝑓 ℎ𝑢𝑚𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙  
𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑣௜௧ ൌ log of investment ratio  
𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑂𝑃௜௧ ൌ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 
3.4 Description of Variables and Data Sources 
This section presents a discussion as well as justification for variables used in this study. Some 
a priori expectations of coefficient sign of variables are also discussed. 
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3.3.1 Dependent variable 
GDP per capita PPP: It is estimated from GDP changed to international dollars by 
using PPP (purchasing power parity) rates. It accounts for relative living standards across 
countries, making it a better measure for comparing income levels across countries. Moreover, 
the change in log GDP per capita approximates economic growth. The data for GDP per capita 
PPP is sourced from the World Bank’s WDI. 
3.3.2 Explanatory variables 
Institutional quality: Institutional quality along with trade is our variable of interest. 
Following seminal works by Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Rodrik et al (2004), this study adopts 
rule of law as the main measure of institutional quality. Rule of law captures important aspects 
of economic institutions such as law and order and the extent to which property rights and 
contractual agreements are enforced in a country. Other measures of institutional quality such 
as control of corruption, voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, 
regulatory quality, and government effectiveness are also introduced in this study. All measures 
of institutions are based on the work by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2011) obtained from 
WGI database. The definitions of the various measures of institutions from the WGI database 
are as follows;   
    Rule of Law: Captures the perception that people have about the rules that govern them; such 
as the quality of law enforcement, property rights, contract enforcement, along with the 
prospect of crime and violence.  
    Regulatory Quality: This index captures government’s ability to put together and carry out 
policies and regulations that encourages the development of private sector.  
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        Control of corruption: The index captures perceptions of the degree to which public office 
is used for private benefit. It covers all forms of major and minor corruption, as well as the 
extent to which private interest influence decision-making to their own benefit.  
        Government Effectiveness: The index captures opinions about the quality of civil and 
public services, and how independent they are from political influence. It also covers the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and how committed government is to such policies.  
  Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: This index captures perceptions of the 
possibility of politically-motivated violence and/or political instability.  
    Voice and Accountability: captures perceptions of the degree to which citizens are able to 
partake in choosing their government, and the extent to which they exercise their freedom of 
association and expression, as well as a free media.  
All institutional variables are measured between an approximate maximum and minimum 
values of െ2.5 and 2.5 respectively.  
 
 Trade; Trade-GDP ratio or trade openness ratio is the most commonly used measure of 
trade in growth analysis. It is calculated by dividing the sum of the value of exports and imports 
in a year by the GDP of the same year. Although referred to as a ratio, it is written as a 
percentage. It measures how open an economy is to international trade, and it is often viewed 
as a measure of the degree of globalisation of an economy (Harris, 2008). In a developing 
country context, trade openness is expected to lead to growth through technology transfer from 
advanced countries among other things. However, the link becomes obscure as one begins to 
consider the conditions and circumstances required for trade to lead to growth (Rodriguez and 
Rodrik, 2001). A positive coefficient for the Trade variable is expected. The data for trade-
GDP ratio is obtained from the World Bank’s WDI.   
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3.3.2.1 Controls 
Initial GDP per capita PPP: Initial GDP per capita accounts for the fact that different 
countries have different levels of GDP per capita which may affect subsequent GDP per capita 
growth. Its inclusion allows us to account for subsequent persistence or decay of real GDP per 
capita over time. A negative coefficient for initial GDP per capita indicates evidence of 
convergence, that is, previously low-income countries are catching up to high-income countries. 
A positive coefficient on the other hand indicates that previously high-income countries are 
growing faster than low-income countries.  
Investment ratio:  Investment in physical capital is a vital source of economic growth, 
as identified by a long line of distinguished economists (Harrod, 1939; Solow 1957; Kaldor 
1961). Studies such as Mankiw et al. (1992), Barro (2003), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) all 
found a positive effect of capital accumulation in cross-country growth regressions. We expect 
a positive coefficient for the gross capital formation variable. The share of gross capital 
formation in GDP is extracted from the WDI database. 
Population growth; the debate on the impact of population growth to economic growth 
is as old as economics itself (Tsen & Furuoka, 2005). Malthus (1798) argues that there is an 
inclination for population to outgrow productivity, and when this happens, countries will 
tumble into periods of intense poverty. Becker, Glaesar and Murphy (1999), demonstrated that 
the Malthusian predictions were inconsistent with available evidence. They argue that 
population growth could have either positive or negative impact on productivity. Essentially, a 
large population boosts the labour force, provides vast market for the domestic economy, and 
encourages competitive behaviour, which leads to innovation. Nonetheless, it may reduce 
productivity due to diminishing returns to the intensive use of resources and overburdening of 
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economic infrastructure. The data for population and population growth is extracted from the 
WDI database.   
Human Capital; human capital basically refers to knowledge and skills embodied in 
individuals (Crawford, 1991). A steady rise in human capital development is essential for rapid 
transitional growth (Sachs & Warner, 1997). Average years of schooling or returns to education 
is widely used in the literature as a proxy for human capital. Barro (1991, 2001, 2003), Mulligan 
and Xavier (1997) and Barro and Lee (1993) used various measures of educational attainment 
as proxy for human capital and discovered that it positively relates to growth. Mankiw et al. 
(1992) proxy human capital using the percentage of secondary school students who fall within 
the working age population. We avoid using Secondary School Enrolment rates due to 
inconsistent enrolment data for most African countries. This study uses index of human capital 
per person from the PWT version 9.0 as proxy for human capital. The index is based on the 
average years of schooling by Barro and Lee (2012) and the returns to education by 
Psacharopoulos (1994).  Following several studies on the subject, we expect a positive 
coefficient for the human capital variable.  
 
3.5  Econometric Methodology 
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator gives the best liner unbiased estimator of 
coefficients according to the Gauss-Markov theorem, but that depends on meeting a set of 
conditions.  Unfortunately, the model specified in equation (3.11) above and subsequently in 
equation (3.12) violates some of these known conditions. For instance, since the dependent 
variable depends on its own past value, it is necessarily correlated with the error term. This 
renders traditional OLS estimates biased and unreliable. Using a standard panel data technique 
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such as Fixed Effect (FE) estimator may be inappropriate too given the relatively short time 
period of our data due to “Nickell bias” (illustration below).  
ሺ𝑦௜௧ െ 𝑦ത௜ሻ ൌ 𝛾ሺ𝑦௜௧ିଵ െ 𝑦ത௜ିଵሻ ൅ ሺ𝑥௜௧ െ ?̅?௜ሻ𝛽 ൅ ሺ𝜇௜ െ ?̅?௜ሻ  ൅ ሺ𝑣௜௧ െ ?̅?௜ሻ 
𝑦ത௜ ൌ  ଵ் ∑ 𝑦௜௧௧்ୀଵ ;  𝑦ത௜ିଵ ൌ  
ଵ
்ିଵ ∑ 𝑦௜௧ିଵ;௧்ୀଶ   ?̅?௜ ൌ  
ଵ
் ∑ 𝑥௜௧௧்ୀଵ ;  ?̅?௜ ൌ  
ଵ
் ∑ 𝜇௜௧்ୀଵ ; ?̅?௜ ൌ  
ଵ
் ∑ 𝑣௜௧௧்ୀଵ    
                                 ሺ3.13ሻ 
By subtracting the average of all observations from their respective current values, within 
transformation eliminates the unobserved country specific effect, 𝜇௜; since 𝜇௜  is a constant, 
𝜇௜ ൌ ?̅?௜  and therefore gets expunged. However, the lagged dependent variable remains 
correlated with 𝑣௜௧ିଵ, which is a component of ?̅?௜. The correlation diminishes with panel length 
as the effect of 𝑣௜௧ିଵ on ?̅?௜ diminishes over time. So, for a dynamic panel model, FE generates 
biased coefficient estimates due to “Nickell bias”. Nickell (1981) identifies that the bias is of 
order 1/𝑇 and thus disappears as 𝑇 ⟶  ∞.  
Alternatively, we could use a first-difference (FD) estimator to expunge the country specific 
effect as shown below. 
∆𝑦௜௧ ൌ 𝛾∆𝑦௜௧ିଵ ൅ ∆𝑥′௜௧𝛽 ൅ ∆𝑣௜௧ 
ሺ3.14ሻ 
Since 𝜇௜ is time invariant it gets eliminated. With 𝜇௜ expunged an Instrumental Variable (IV) 
method can be used, provided valid instruments can be found. For an instrument set 𝑧௜, the 
conditions necessary to qualify as a valid instrument is; 
 Relevance         𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 ሺ𝑧௜, 𝑦௜௧ିଵሻ  ് 0 
 Exogeneity                𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 ሺ𝑧௜, 𝑣௜௧ሻ     ൌ 0 
ሺ3.15ሻ 
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Another major concern is the issue of potential endogeneity arising from the relationship 
between trade and institution and the dependent variable (economic growth). This could as well 
be resolved using an IV approach, and again on condition that valid instruments could be found. 
For a given explanatory variable X and its instrument θ, the conditions below must be satisfied.  
 Relevance         𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 ሺ𝜃௜,  𝑥௜௧ሻ  ് 0 
 Exogeneity                𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟 ሺ𝜃௜, 𝑣௜௧ሻ  ൌ 0 
ሺ3.16ሻ 
Given the strict conditions in equations (3.15) and (3.16) above, valid instruments are in reality 
very difficult to find. Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose a method that uses variables 
generated within the model as instruments. They propose using  𝑦௜௧ିଶ  or ∆𝑦௜௧ିଶ ሺ𝑦௜௧ିଶ െ
𝑦௜௧ିଷሻ as instrument for ∆𝑦௜௧ିଵ(𝑦௜௧ିଵ െ 𝑦௜௧ିଶ). This is because although 𝑦௜௧ିଶ  or ∆𝑦௜௧ିଶ  is 
correlated with  ∆𝑦௜௧ିଵ, it is however uncorrelated with ∆𝑣௜௧ (𝑣௜௧ െ 𝑣௜௧ିଵሻ, thereby satisfying 
conditions for both relevance and exogeneity respectively. Following the same argument, for 
any endogenous variable 𝑋 , 𝑥௜௧ିଵ  or ∆𝑥௜௧ିଵ ሺ𝑥௜௧ିଵ െ 𝑥௜௧ିଶሻ can be used as instrument for 
∆𝑥௜௧(𝑥௜௧ െ 𝑥௜௧ିଵ).   
Despite the novelty of the Anderson-Hsiao (AH) method, it has been criticized for not making 
use of all the information made available by the structure of the panel. Arellano and Bond 
(1991), by making an extra assumption about the nature of the error terms, were able to develop 
a technique that exploits all available instruments in the model. Arellano and Bond (1991) 
made an explicit assumption that the error terms are not serially correlated, thus; 
𝐸ሾ𝑦௜௧ି௦, ∆𝑣௜௧ሿ ൌ 0  
 𝐸ሾ𝑥௜௧ି௦, ∆𝑣௜௧ሿ ൌ 0  
𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡 ൌ 3, … , 𝑇; 𝑠 ൒ 2 
 ሺ3.17ሻ 
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Equation (3.17) above implies that variables from time 𝑡 െ 2 and those prior to that, can be 
employed as instruments in first difference equations. This method is known as the difference 
Generalized Method of Moments (difference GMM). Arellano and Bond (1991) performed 
some experiments which affirmed that their method outperforms OLS, within-groups and the 
AH method. Nevertheless, difference GMM has some known limitations. By construction, it 
cannot estimate time invariant variables since they get eliminated in differenced equations. 
Also, it tends to magnify gaps in unbalanced panels since for every missing observation, both 
the first difference and the lagged first-difference will be missing from the transformed data. 
Moreover, it has been proven to perform poorly in estimating persistent models (Blundell & 
Bond, 1998).   
Blundell and Bond (1998), recommend a method known as system GMM that treats the model 
as a system of equations, the first in transformed form and the other in levels. They achieve 
this by making extra assumptions about the nature of the model. They assumed that the 
deviations of 𝑦௜௧ from its long-run average are not correlated to the individual specific effect. 
Thus; 
𝐸ሾሺ𝑦௜ଵ െ 𝑦ത௜ሻ, 𝜇௜ሿ ൌ  0    𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ൌ 1, … , 𝑁.       
 (3.18)  
Combining the above with the assumption that the country-specific effects are uncorrelated 
with the disturbance term ሺ 𝐸൫𝑣௜௧, 𝜇௜൯ ൌ 0ሻ, implies; 
𝐸ሾ∆𝑦௜௧ିଵ, ሺ𝜇௜ ൅ 𝑣௜௧ሻሿ ൌ 0 
𝐸ሾ∆𝑥௜௧ିଵ, ሺ𝜇௜ ൅ 𝑣௜௧ሻሿ ൌ 0 
For 𝑖 ൌ 1, 2, … , 𝑁 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡 ൌ 3, 4, 5, … , 𝑇 
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ሺ3.19ሻ 
These conditions combined with those specified under the Arellano-Bond (AB) method permits 
the model to be treated as a system of equations. 
∆𝑦௜௧ ൌ 𝛾∆𝑦௜௧ିଵ ൅ ∆𝑥′௜௧𝛽 ൅ ∆𝑣௜௧ 
𝑦௜௧ ൌ 𝛾𝑦௜௧ିଵ ൅ 𝑥′௜௧𝛽 ൅ 𝜇௜ ൅ 𝑣௜௧ 
ሺ3.20ሻ 
Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest using lagged first-difference as instruments in levels 
equation in addition to using lags of levels as instruments for transformed equation. Blundell 
and Bond (1998) reveal that their method outperforms difference GMM estimator in samples 
where the time period is relatively small and the autoregressive parameter ( 𝛾) is high.  
The major strength of the system GMM approach is its ability to obtain consistent and less 
controversial estimates in the presence of endogeneity. By using internally generated 
instruments, it eliminates the weak instrument problem associated with the use of external 
instruments. Moreover, the model accommodates time invariant variables, making it possible 
to estimate their coefficients. Furthermore, it has been shown to consistently outperform other 
class of estimators in estimating dynamic panel models (see Blundell & Bond, 1998; and Bond, 
Hoeffler & Temple, 2001). 
The credibility of system GMM estimates depends largely on the validity of its assumptions. 
The Arellano Bond (AB) test for autocorrelation and the Sargan (1958)/Hansen (1982) test for 
over-identifying restrictions are employed to examine the validity of the underlying 
assumptions. The AB test for autocorrelation of order two (AR (2)) tests for autocorrelation in 
the levels equation whilst the Sargan/Hansen test identifies whether the instruments are 
collectively uncorrelated with the error term, thus it tests for instrument exogeneity.  
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4.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter we presented a detailed discussion of the theoretical framework based on the 
human capital augmented Solow model. An empirical model was proposed to estimate the 
impact of the variables of interest on economic growth.  Under econometric methodology an 
argument was made why OLS and other traditional panel data techniques such as FE will lead 
to biased and inconsistent estimates. We further looked at the strengths and weaknesses of 
some other estimation techniques. Our choice of system GMM was based on some specific 
features of the empirical model to be estimated. We finally propose using AB test for AR (2) 
and Sargan (1958)/Hansen (1982) test for over-identifying restriction to test the validity of the 
system GMM estimates.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents estimation results and discussion based on the empirical model proposed 
in chapter 3 above. The statistical software package Stata 14 by StataCorp LP is used for the 
estimations. 
The chapter is arranged as follows; Section 4.2 presents descriptive statistics of all variables 
used. Section 4.3 presents the estimation results.   
4.2  Descriptive Statistics 
For the period 2000-2016, the average GDP per capita PPP in SSA was $4,478.8, which is 
equivalent to the GNI per capita of upper-middle income economies per the World Bank’s 
classification. However, income distribution within the region is far from equal as evidenced 
by a huge standard deviation of $6,071. The highest GDP per capita over the period is 
$40,015.8 recorded in Equatorial Guinea in 2008 whilst the lowest recorded is $503.8 in 
Democratic Republic of Congo in 2002. GDP per capita PPP growth averaged 1.9% with a 
standard deviation of 4.9% maximum of 45% and a minimum of -45.9%.  
The share of Trade in GDP averaged 76.6% which is huge compared to the world average of 
30% in 2014 (WTO, 2015). However, by construction, trade-to-GDP ratio will be high for 
countries with low GDPs.  Regardless, it is a very good indicator of the relative importance of 
trade to the economies of countries in the region. The maximum trade-to-GDP ratio for the 
period is 351% in Equatorial Guinea in 2001. Between 2000 and 2004, Equatorial Guinea 
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consistently achieved trade-to-GDP ratio in excess of 240%. On the contrary, Sudan 
persistently registered the lowest trade-to-GDP ratio with the least being 19.5% in 2014.  
Population growth in the region is relatively high, the average over the period is 2.5% compared 
to the world average of 1.2%. The maximum recorded is 5.5% in Rwanda in 2000. Equatorial 
Guinea attained the highest population growth rate for consecutive years between 2006 and 
2014.  Seychelles reports some of the lowest population growth rate with the minimum of -2.6% 
in 2011.  
The average investment-GDP ratio over the period is 21.6% with a standard deviation of 11.9%. 
Some notable highs of 125.5%, 145.8% and 114.7% were achieved in Equatorial Guinea in 
2000, 2001 and 2003 respectively. The lowest over the period was 2.0% recorded in Zimbabwe 
in 2005.  
The human capital index from the PWT version 9.0 is available for only 34 SSA countries and 
a shorter period between 2000 – 2014. The maximum value of the index recorded over the 
period is 2.8, a minimum of 1.07, an average of 1.7, and a standard deviation of 0.4. Botswana 
consistently achieved the highest index between 2000 and 2014 whilst Burkina Faso registered 
some of the lowest values over the period including minimum of 1.07 in 2000.   
The measures of institutional quality fall within an approximate theoretical minimum of -2.5 
and maximum of 2.5. By construction, the world average for each index at any particular period 
is zero. The fact that the average values recorded are all negative is indicative of the poor 
quality of institutions in the region. Mauritius achieved the highest value for both rule of law 
and regulatory quality over the years whilst Somalia, on the other hand, recorded the lowest 
values for both measures over the same period.  
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Table 4. 1 Summary Statistics for all variables 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Maximum Minimum
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 
2011 international $) 
743 4,478.8 6,070.9 40,015.8 503.8 
GDP per capita PPP growth 
(annual %) 
742 1.9 4.9 45.0 -45.9 
Trade (% of GDP) 700 76.6 38.9 351.1 19.1 
Population (total, million) 760 18.3 27.0 186 .08 
Population growth (annual %) 760 2.5 0.85 5.5 -2.6 
Investment (% of GDP) 683 21.6 11.9 145.7 2.0 
Human capital (index per person) 510 1.71 0.41 2.81 1.07 
Institutional quality      
Rule of Law 675 -0.71 0.67 1.06 -2.67 
Political Stability and Violence 675 -0.54 0.95 1.19` -3.32 
Regulatory quality 675 -0.69 0.65 1.12 -2.66 
Voice and accountability 675 -0.60 0.75 1.02 -2.23 
Control of corruption 675 -0.63 0.63 1.22 -1.87 
Government effectiveness 675 -0.77 0.63 1.05 -2.45 
Source: Author’s own calculation  
4.3 Estimation Results and Discussion 
Estimation results for this study are illustrated in four different tables below. Some relevant 
diagnostic tests are presented in the lower part of the tables as well. 
Table 4.2 below shows results from regression of change in log GDP per capita on lagged GDP 
per capita, trade and institutions. Three estimation techniques are employed in estimating Table 
1. Column (1) reports results using a Fixed Effect (FE) estimator, column (2) shows IV-2SLS 
regression results and column (3) shows system GMM results. Other variables are omitted in 
Table 4.2 so as to ascertain the true impact of institutions and trade on growth without leaving 
out any of their effects operating through other variables. Given that both trade and institutions 
are instrumented properly, and the instruments are not correlated with other determinants of 
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income growth, we can safely assume all other omitted variables are in the error term without 
any bias.  In any event the preceding conditions are violated, results from Table 4.2 might not 
necessarily imply true causal effect although it still gives a very good account of the 
relationship between institutions, trade and economic growth in SSA. 
Table 4. 2 Growth Regression with Institution and Trade 
Dependent Variable:              Change in log GDP per capita income PPP  
 (1) FE (2) IV-2SLS (3) Sys- GMM 
Lagged GDP per 
capita 
-0.134*** 
(0.023) 
 
-0.025* 
(0.014) 
 
 0.0191*** 
(0.00229) 
Institution (RL) 0.054*** 
(0.018) 
 
0.072** 
(0.030) 
0.0489*** 
(0.00501) 
 
Trade 0.040*** 
(0.013) 
 
0.022 
(0.030) 
0.0802*** 
(0.00725) 
 
    
Constant 0.929*** 
(0.193) 
 
0.166** 
(0.075) 
-0.435*** 
(0.0402) 
 
Observations 644 305 568 
No. of countries 45  25 45 
AR(2) p-value   0.164 
Hansen J-statistic  0.00 0.777 
Instruments    
       Predicted Trade    ✓  
       Settler Mortality  ✓  
Note: robust standard errors in parenthesis All variables except Institution are in logs. 
 *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
Column (1) shows a positive and highly significant coefficient for both trade and institution 
variables. The point estimates for institution and trade are 0.05 and 0.04 respectively implying 
a positive correlation between both variables and income growth.  This however does not imply 
causality due to some econometric issues as already stated. We try resolving this by following 
several similar studies in using an instrumental variable (IV) approach in column (2).  
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Adhering to a long line of tradition in the literature, we instrument institutions using log of 
European settler mortality from Acemoglu et al. (2001), also following Frankel and Romer 
(1999) we construct fitted trade values from a modified gravity equation to instrument trade. 
Data for settler mortality is available for only 27 out of 47 SSA countries, and bilateral trade 
data for estimating fitted trade values is available for a consistent sample of 37 countries. This 
effectively reduces the sample to 25 countries. The IV estimates from column (2) shows that 
institution remains significant with a slightly larger coefficient whereas trade loses its 
significance despite remaining positive. This outcome is similar to that obtained by Dollar and 
Kraay (2003) and Rodrik et al. (2004) using IV regression. We are however confronted with a 
multicollinearity problem as specified by Dollar and Kraay (2003). Results from the first-stage 
(see appendix III) indicates that both the fitted values of trade and settler mortality variable are 
highly correlated with both trade and institution.  Indeed, the p-value of the Hansen J statistic 
in column (2) implies that our instruments are not valid. Therefore, results from Table 4.2 
column (2) may be uninformative about the causal relationship between trade, institutions, and 
economic growth.  
In column (3), a system GMM estimator is used in a bid to circumvent some of these problems. 
All three explanatory variables are treated as endogenous. The results show both trade and 
institution are positive and highly significant with point estimates of 0.08 and 0.05 respectively. 
This implies a percentage increase in trade is expected to produce a 0.08% increase in income 
growth whereas a unit increase in index of institutional quality (rule of law) is associated with 
a 5% increase in income growth. The validity of instruments used are confirmed by the AB test 
for AR (2) and the Hansen J-statistic in the lower part of the table.  
Before making any general conclusion about the relationship between institutions, trade and 
growth, we specify our full empirical model in Table 4.3 to further analyze the behavior of the 
variables.  Thus, we introduce investment ratio, population growth and human capital as 
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additional variables. Table 4.3 columns (1) and (2) report results for 34 SSA countries for 
which data on human capital is available from the PWT.  Columns (3) and (4) displays results 
for a larger sample of 45 countries without the human capital variable.   
Table 4. 3 Growth Regression with Additional Controls 
Dependent Variable                   Change in log GDP per capita income PPP  
 (1) FE (2) GMM (3) FE (4) GMM 
Lagged GDP per capita -0.143*** 
(0.024) 
 
0.010 
(0.011) 
 
-0.141*** 
(0.016) 
 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
Institutions (RL) 0.0499*** 
(0.014) 
0.040*** 
(0.015) 
0.038*** 
(0.013) 
0.030*** 
(0.005) 
 
Trade-GDP ratio 0.026** 
(0.012) 
0.045*** 
(0.015) 
0.021* 
(0.011) 
 
0.073*** 
(0.006) 
Controls     
Population Growth 0.026*** 
(0.009) 
0.043*** 
(0.006) 
0.034*** 
(0.009) 
0.031*** 
(0.005) 
Human Capital 0.171*** 
(0.062) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
  
Investment Ratio 0.011 
(0.009) 
0.005 
(0.015) 
0.028*** 
(0.008) 
0.008*** 
(0.003) 
     
Constant 0.915*** 
(0.181) 
-0.276** 
(0.112) 
0.949*** 
(0.140) 
-0.275***
(0.068) 
 
Observation 421 421 529 627 
Adj. R-squared 0.16  0.22  
Countries 34 34 45 45 
AR(2)  0.600  0.345 
Hansen J  0.997  0.939 
Note: All variables except Institutions are in logs. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
Results from Table 4.3 indicates both trade and institution retain their significance despite the 
addition of control variables. The point estimate for rule of law is 0.04 in column (2) and 0.03 
in column (4) whilst that of trade is 0.05 and 0.07 in columns (2) and (4) respectively. The 
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results do not differ significantly between the two samples. Moreover, investment and human 
capital variable have their expected signs. Interestingly, population growth is consistently 
positive and significant in all specifications. In fact, the correlation matrix (see appendix II) 
indicates the two variables move together.  
In Table 4.4 we add measures of geography, regional dummies and FDI to account for other 
sources of economic growth variations among countries in the region and also to test robustness 
of our results. Column (1) introduces latitude (distance from the equator) and landlock dummy. 
Studies such as, Dollar and Kraay (2003) and Rodrick et al. (2004) employ latitude in 
estimating the relationship between institutions, trade and growth. Dollar and Kraay (2003) 
also add a landlock dummy. Acemoglu et al. (2001) employ latitude to estimate the relationship 
between institutions and growth. In column (2), regional dummies corresponding to the four 
main economic blocs in the sub-region are included. The economic blocs are the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community 
(SADC), East African Community (EAC), and Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS). In column (3), we include the ratio of FDI to GDP to observe and compare the 
relative importance of FDI and trade to economic growth. FDI, like trade is an important source 
of foreign technology and skills to developing countries and as such contributes to growth. 
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Table 4. 4 Growth Regression with Geography variables and FDI 
Results from Table 4.4 indicates that both trade and institution are stable and significant in all 
specifications. The inclusion of geography variables in column (1) does not change the 
established relationship between institutions, trade and growth, neither does regional dummies 
and FDI in columns (2) and (3) respectively. Both geography variables fail to attain 
significance at any conventional level. This finding is similar to studies such as Acemoglu et 
al. (2001), Dollar and Kraay (2003), and Rodrik et al. (2004) which established the supremacy 
of institutions over geography in determining cross-country differences in income. 
Dependent Variable                        Change in log GDP per capita income PPP 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Sys GMM System GMM System GMM 
Lagged GDP per capita -0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
Institutions (Rule of Law) 0.037** 
(0.015) 
0.041** 
(0.019) 
0.063*** 
(0.019) 
Trade 0.039*** 
(0.015) 
0.035** 
(0.014) 
0.039* 
(0.024) 
Investment Ratio 0.021 
(0.013) 
0.020 
(0.014) 
-0.004 
(0.018) 
Population Growth 0.020*** 
(0.008) 
0.023*** 
(0.008) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
    
Latitude (Distance from the 
equator) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
  
Landlock 0.006 
(0.009) 
  
FDI   0.001 
(0.003) 
    
Constant 0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.130 
(0.113) 
-0.008 
(0.154) 
Year dummies ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Regional dummies  ✓  
    
Observations 627 627 567 
No. of countries 45 45 45 
AR(2) p-value 0.121 0.126 0.257 
Hansen J-statistic p-value 0.292 0.321 0.428 
All variables except rule of law, latitude, and landlocked are in logs.  
*** significant at 1%, **significant at 5% and *significant at 10% 
Source: Author’s own calculation 
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Furthermore, FDI although positive is not significant. It’s inclusion however reduces the 
significance of trade.  
Given the above results and the corresponding diagnostic tests, we can reliably conclude that 
our finding of a positive impact of trade and institution on growth in SSA is robust and can 
therefore be reliably inferred as true causal effect.   
4.3.1 Other measures of institutions  
Five other measures of institution – namely regulatory quality, government effectiveness, voice 
and accountability, control of corruption, and political stability and absence of 
violence/terrorism – are introduced in Table 4.5. The results are divided into two parts like 
before. Columns (1) to (6) show results from a sample of 34 countries between 2000 and 2014 
whilst column (7) to (12) shows results for a larger sample of 45 SSA countries and a relatively 
longer time period, 2000 to 2016. 
Results from columns (1) to (6) indicates that human capital index appears insignificant in all 
specifications although mostly positive. All measures of institutions are positive except 
regulatory quality which appears negative in column (2) although insignificant.   
For columns (7) to (12) trade is positive and significant at 1% in all specifications. The point 
estimates range from 0.06 to 0.08. Moreover, all institutional variables save regulatory quality 
are positive and significant at 1%. Regulatory quality although positive is not significant at any 
acceptable level. Of all the measures of institution, political stability has the highest point 
estimate of 0.043, followed by control of corruption at 0.035, government effectiveness at 
0.033, Rule of law at 0.030 and voice and accountability at 0.019. Furthermore, population 
growth and investment ratio are positive and highly significant in all specifications. Lagged 
income is negative although hardly significant indicating some form of conditional 
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convergence in the sub-region. Our findings indicate that trade has a positive effect on 
economic growth in SSA and whilst institutions in all its forms matter for economic growth, 
political stability has the greatest impact.  
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Table 4.5 System GMM Estimations: Dependent Variable:             Change in log GDP per capita income PPP  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Lagged GDP per 
capita 
0.010 
(0.011) 
0.007 
(0.007) 
0.026**
(0.012) 
0.021* 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
0.038***
(0.012) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
Trade-GDP 0.045*** 
(0.015) 
0.022 
(0.014) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
0.037***
(0.012) 
0.026* 
(0.014) 
0.048***
(0.012) 
0.073***
(0.006) 
0.058***
(0.006) 
0.062***
(0.006) 
0.067***
(0.005) 
0.060*** 
(0.007) 
0.079*** 
(0.005) 
Investment ratio 0.005 
(0.007) 
0.032*** 
(0.006) 
0.015***
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
0.008***
(0.003) 
0.024***
(0.004) 
0.013***
(0.004) 
0.012***
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
Population growth 0.043*** 
(0.006) 
0.011* 
(0.006) 
0.038***
(0.009) 
0.044***
(0.010) 
0.030***
(0.010) 
0.050***
(0.007) 
0.031***
(0.005) 
0.018***
(0.005) 
0.026***
(0.004) 
0.033***
(0.005) 
0.026*** 
(0.003) 
0.038*** 
(0.004) 
Human capital 
index 
0.006 
(0.008) 
0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
0.003 
(0.007) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.008 
(0.012) 
      
      
             
Rule of law 0.040***      0.030***      
 (0.015)      (0.005)      
Regulatory quality  -0.008      0.010     
  (0.013)      (0.009)     
Political Stability   0.016***      0.043***    
   (0.005)      (0.005)    
Government 
Effectiveness 
   0.025***      0.033***   
   (0.009)      (0.008)   
Voice and 
Accountability 
    0.054***      0.019***  
    (0.010)      (0.005)  
Control of 
corruption 
     0.010      0.035*** 
     (0.012)      (0.005) 
             
Constant -0.28** 
(0.112) 
-0.24*** 
(0.063) 
-0.31***
(0.078) 
-0.33***
(0.098) 
-0.081 
(0.092) 
-0.53***
(0.086) 
-0.28*** 
(0.068) 
-0.28***
(0.048) 
-0.20***
(0.061) 
-0.25***
(0.063) 
-0.28*** 
(0.050) 
-0.36*** 
(0.059) 
Observations 421 421 421 421 421 421 627 627 627 627 627 627 
No. of Countries 34 34 34 34 34 34 45 45 45 45 45 45 
AR(2) 0.60 0.971 0.480 0.567 0.384 0.556 0.128 0.100 0.268 0.142 0.157 0.124 
Hansen J statistic 0.997 0.999 0.995 0.994 0.992 0.996 0.992 0.989 0.975 0.982 0.986 0.985 
Note: All variables except measures of Institutions are in logs. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** Significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and * significant at 10%. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
5.1 Concluding Remarks 
This study sought out to determine the partial effect of trade and institution on economic growth 
in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Due to potential endogeneity between trade and growth, as well 
as measures of institution and growth, we follow several studies by using an IV approach. 
However, as shown by our first stage regression results, widely used instruments of trade and 
institution in the literature are themselves correlated with both endogenous variables. This 
renders IV estimates uninformative about the true impact of institutions and trade on economic 
growth. 
This study addresses the problem by using a system GMM estimator. Two features of system 
GMM makes it appealing for estimating our baseline mode. First, the estimator uses internally 
generated instruments to control for endogeneity. Also, it is more efficient and outperforms 
other class of estimators in estimating dynamic panel models (see Blundell & Bond, 1998; and 
Bond, Hoeffler &Temple, 2001).   
The estimation results are overwhelmingly supportive of the positive impact of institutions and 
trade on economic growth in SSA. The findings are robust over different specifications. 
Interestingly, population growth has a positive impact on economic growth once we control for 
initial GDP, institutions, trade, investment ratio and human capital. This outcome is supportive 
of the findings by Kremer (1993), who proved empirically that high population growth rate is 
associated with technological advancement which in turn improves labor productivity, per 
capita income and overall standards of living. Furthermore, the study found no significant 
effect for measures of geography. Lastly, we reveal that all other measures of institutional 
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quality save regulatory quality are significant for economic growth in SSA. Of the measures of 
institutional quality, political stability and absence of violence/terrorism and control of 
corruption are the most influential followed by government effectiveness, rule of law and voice 
and accountability in that order.  
Nevertheless, there are two important caveats to our findings. First, the measures of institution 
used in this study are based on perception measures rather than fact based verifiable measures. 
The conclusion from this study holds as far as people’s perceptions reflect reality on the ground. 
Otherwise our findings might not be very informative about the true causal relationship 
between institutions and economic performance.  Secondly, the nature of the measures of 
institution make it difficult to recommend a specific policy measure. For instance, rule of law 
index captures quality of contract enforcement, property rights, courts and the police. The index 
does not state the type of contract enforcement procedure, or property rights regime, or court 
structure that will enhance (perceptions of) the rule of law. Therefore, a country may know 
what to do to achieve growth but may not know exactly how to go about it. 
Nevertheless, it is crucial for countries in SSA to understand that institutional quality is critical 
to the basic functioning of their economies. The type of policies to pursue however may differ 
from one country to another.  
5.2 Policy Recommendation  
Following from our findings above, it may be economically expedient to devote resources to 
building institutional structures first before anything else. As a matter of general 
recommendation, it will be essential for countries in SSA to pursue policies that promotes 
political stability, strengthens the fight against corruption, improves government effectiveness 
and promotes adherence to the rule of law. Indeed, it is very difficult to perceive how a country 
could encourage investment in human and physical capital in the absence of political stability 
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or property rights protection or general adherence to the rule of law. Likewise, endemic 
corruption and government ineffectiveness may render proven growth enhancing policies 
useless.  
Nevertheless, it may be imprudent to entrust political leaders in SSA with the full responsibility 
of institutional reforms. This is because, political power in most countries in the region is in 
the hands of an elite few who may have exploited current institutional weaknesses to amass 
power and wealth. In this regard, development partners have a big role to play in ensuring 
compliance through foreign aid and loan conditionalities. This strategy might be very effective 
given that all countries in SSA are recipients of foreign aid.  
Indeed, loan conditionalities have been used by both the IMF and the World Bank in 
implementing controversial structural adjustments programs in the region. Although the impact 
of the adjustment programs continues to be a heavily debated topic, the compliance strategy 
was largely successful. Moreover, unlike the SAPs the institutional reforms that these 
conditionalities seek to achieve resonates with the masses and may engender huge public 
support. 
Promoting strong institutional structures in recipient country should also be in the interest of 
development partners. Transparency in the use of foreign aid will contribute to aid 
effectiveness and also accountability to donors themselves. Studies such as Alesina and Dollar 
(2000), Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier and Dollar (2002) demonstrate that the 
effectiveness of aid in promoting growth in recipient countries depends crucially on the quality 
of policy environment. 
Furthermore, it should be emphasized that different countries may require different set of 
institutions at any point in time, so generic conditionalities might not work. Individual countries 
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should be engaged to determine which type of institutions are necessary given their level of 
development.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix I: Economic growth trends from 2000 to 2014 
 
     Source: World Bank – Worldwide Development Indicators  
 
Appendix II: Simple correlation matrix of all variables 
Change in 
GDP per 
capita  
Trade-
GDP 
ratio 
Invest
ment 
ratio 
Populat
ion 
growth 
Human 
capital 
index 
Rule 
of 
law 
Regul
atory 
quality
Political 
Stability 
Voice 
and 
account. 
Corr
uptio
n 
Gov't 
Effect.
Change in 
GDP per 
capita  
1.000    
Trade-GDP 
ratio 
0.128 1.000 
Investment 
ratio 
0.230 0.370 1.000 
Population 
growth 
0.074 -0.193 0.062 1.000 
Human 
capital index 
0.073 0.012 0.076 0.199 1.000 
Rule of law 0.124 0.208 0.423 -0.401 -0.054 1.000
Regulatory 
quality 
0.120 0.092 0.364 -0.337 0.060 0.869 1.000
Political 
Stability 
0.084 0.396 0.346 -0.256 -0.025 0.785 0.638 1.000 
Voice and 
accountability 
0.114 0.175 0.248 -0.344 -0.077 0.797 0.770 0.668 1.000 
Corruption 0.094 0.215 0.323 -0.466 -0.061 0.883 0.743 0.702 0.727 1.00
Gov't 
Effectiveness 
0.132 0.157 0.343 -0.454 -0.040 0.915 0.878 0.682 0.756 0.859 1.00 
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Appendix III: First-Stage results of IV-2SLS regression from Table 4.2 
Dependent variable Rule of Law Actual Trade 
Initial GDP per capita  0.193*** 
(0.0448) 
0.326*** 
(0.028) 
Predicted Trade  0.026*** 
(0.008) 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
Settler Mortality  -0.118*** 
(0.028) 
0.118**** 
(0.18) 
    
Constant  -1.658*** 
(0.422) 
0.790*** 
(0.274) 
    
Adj. R -squared  0.218 0.367 
Robust Standard errors in parenthesis. Significant at 1%***, 5%** and 10%* 
 
 
Appendix IV: Scatter diagram showing correlation between average growth rates and some 
explanatory variables   
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Appendix V: Graphs showing variable trends and availability by country (investment, population growth) 
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Appendix VI: Graphs showing variable trends and availability by country (human capital, fitted trade and 
settler mortality) 
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